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VICTORELLI v SHADYSIDE HOSPITAL-
CHRONIC SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITIONS COVERED
BY THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993
CREATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEADACHES FOR EMPLOYERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the United States Congress passed the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA),I creating a national policy supporting families in their
attempt to balance the competing demands of the workplace and the
home.2 Throughout the past twenty-five years, these demands have inten-
sified as the number of women in the workplace has increased, single-
parent families has grown and a growing number of households contain
two working parents.3 Congress, therefore, faced the dilemma of recog-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
2. See Allan N. Taffet, Family Medical Leave Act Five Years Later, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4,
1997, at I (outlining circumstances surrounding enactment of Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) legislation). The FMLA was signed into law by President Clin-
ton on February 5, 1993. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601. The FMLA took effect for most
employees on February 5, 1993. SeeJeffrey S. Klein & NicholasJ. Pappas, Analysis of
New Family Leave Regulations, N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1995, at 3 (discussing background of
FMLA's enactment and when FMLA actually took effect for America's workforce).
Prior to the FMLA's enactment, the United States was one of only a few coun-
tries in the world that had not enacted a law setting a national standard for family
leave. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RELATIONS, FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAvE ACT or 1993, S. REP. No. 103-3, at 76 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3
(discussing family leave laws in other countries). Furthermore, countries such as
France, Great Britain and Italy had laws requiring maternity benefits dating back
to before World War I. See id. (comparing United States' policies to those of other
industrialized countries). These major industrialized countries maintain policies
with an average minimum paid leave of 12 to 14 weeks with many also providing
employees the right to take unpaid, job-protected leave for at least one year. See id.
(stating further that "the European Community Commission issued a directive re-
quiring that all member countries provide a standard minimum of 14 weeks paid
maternity leave"). Congress has emphasized that the enactment of the FMLA will
close the gap between foreign leave statutes and the policies in the United States.
See id. ("Enactment... will begin to close the gap between the leave statutes and
policies in these countries and the United States.").
3. See Executive Summary (visitedJan. 27, 1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/
public/regs/compliance/whd/fmla/summaryhtm> [hereinafter Executive Sum-
may] (stating that FMLA was passed in reaction to demands of workplace and
home based on "dramatic social and economic changes affecting businesses, em-
ployees and families"). According to the Department of Labor (DOL), the de-
mands on those in the workforce have intensified over the last 25 years as dramatic
social and economic changes have occurred. See id. (commenting that "increasing
competition, technological innovation and instability" have contributed to de-
mands for national leave policies); see also S. REP. No. 103-3, at 67 (1993) ("The
United States has experienced a demographic revolution in the composition of the
workforce, with profound consequences for the lives of working men and women
and their families."). A General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that over
the past 40 years, the female workforce has increased by approximately one million
(973)
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nizing and balancing the legitimate workplace needs of employers by es-
tablishing a minimum standard for unpaid employee leave compelled by
medical exigencies.
4
workers each year. See id. (finding that "[bly 1990, nearly 57 million women were
working or looking for work - more than a 200 percent increase since 1950").
Further, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has predicted that by the year 2005, the
female labor force participation rate will reach 66.1%. See id. (forecasting trends
in work force participation). The Senate also cited to a National Council on Aging
estimate that 20 to 25% of American workers have some care-giving responsibilities
for an older relative. See id. ("Two-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for
older, chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women, the most common
caregiver being a child or spouse.").
Previously, employees had access to family and medical leave only through
collective bargaining agreements or state leave statutes. See Executive Summary,
supra (describing circumstances surrounding enactment of FMLA). These state
statutes, enacted in 34 states, Puerto Rico and Washington D.C., expanded unpaid
leave for some employees, particularly in the area of maternity leave, but very few
were as comprehensive as the FMLA. See id. (discussing state statutes and observ-
ing that "[t] he amount of job-guaranteed leave that a worker could take varied
widely in state law - from 16 hours to 1 year. Eligibility requirements also varied,
and many of the laws applied only to state employees"). Today, the FMLA does
not displace any state laws, but merely creates minimum requirements for family
and medical leave; state laws may authorize greater benefits and protections to
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) ("Nothing in this Act or any amendment made
by this Act shall be construed to supersede any provision of any State or local law
that provides greater family or medical leave rights than the rights established
under this Act or any amendment made by this Act."). Further, the FMLA encour-
ages employers, as well as states, to enact more generous leave policies than pro-
vided for in the FMLA. See id. § 2653 ("Nothing in this Act or any amendment
made by this Act shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or
retaining leave policies more generous than any policies that comply with the re-
quirements under this Act or any amendment made by this Act.").
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1) (stating that one purpose of FMLA is "to bal-
ance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the
stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interest in
preserving family integrity"); see also Murray v. Red Kap Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d 695,
697 (5th Cir. 1997) (opining that FMLA seeks to balance needs of sick employees
against workplace demands); Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("The FMLA was enacted to help working men and women balance the
conflicting demands of work and personal life. It does so by recognizing that there
will be times in a person's life when that person is incapable of performing her
work duties for medical reasons."). Title III of the FMLA established a temporary
bipartisan Commission on Leave ("Commission") to conduct a study of existing
and proposed family and medical leave policies. See 29 U.S.C. § 2631 ("There is
established a commission to be known as the Commission on Leave . . . ."). The
Commission met for the first time on November 10, 1993, and delivered its final
report to Congress on May 1, 1996. See id. This Commission was composed of 12
voting members and 4 "ex-officio" members, including 3 members chosen by then-
Speaker of the House of Representatives Tom Foley (D-Wash.), then-House Minor-
ity Leader Robert Michel (R-Ill.), then-Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-
Maine) and then-Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.). See id.
§ 2633 (a) (1) (C) (discussing appointment of Commission). The four "ex-officio"
members included the secretaries of the United States Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services and Commerce and the administrator of the Small
Business Administration. See id. § 2633(a) (2) (stating that these members "serve
on Commission as non-voting ex officio members"). The Commission's power in-
2
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Today, employers are struggling to administer this enormously com-
plicated law.5 The concept behind the FMLA seemed simple enough-
workers are guaranteed timeoff from their jobs for medical reasons, to
take care of an ill child, spouse or parent, or to give birth or adopt a child
cluded holding hearings, taking testimony and receiving all evidence it considered
appropriate. See id. § 2635 (listing powers invested in Commission).
The Commission's report to Congress concluded that two-thirds of the U.S.
workforce worked for employers covered by the FMLA. See Executive Summary,
supra note 3 (discussing Commission's "major research findings" and its examina-
tion of potential costs, benefits and impact on workplace productivity). Although
the FMLA covers only 11% of the private sector worksites, that 11% employs over
59% of the country's private sector workers. See id. (finding that industries with
largest worksites, such as manufacturing, have large number of FMLA-eligible em-
ployees working in small percentage of worksites). Further, the Commission
found that a majority of covered employers knew of the FMLA's applicability, but
few employees had knowledge of the FMLA. See id. (stating that 86.5% of employ-
ers knew of FMLA and only 58.2% of employees knew of FMLA).
5. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that steady increase in legislation is
not surprising given broad FMLA coverage). Expansive FMLA coverage has
prompted employer testimony in front of Congress regarding the FMLA's difficult
administration. See Testimony of Lynn Outwater Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (1997), avail-
able in 1997 WL 11233541 (testifying on behalf of The Society for Human Resource
Management ("Society") and FMLA Corrections Coalition). In Ms. Outwater's tes-
timony, she stated that "[e]ven though I have spent countless hours training exper-
ienced human resources executives, managers and line supervisors on the
intricacies of the law, I have found that unintentional mistakes continue to be
made in administering it because it is so complicated." Id. Further, in a survey
conducted by the Society, 6 out of 10 employers have experienced significant costs
because of the FMLA.with relatively little benefits. See id. (stating that "approxi-
mately half (51%) of the survey respondents said their organizations had not ex-
perienced any benefits from complying with the FMLA"); see also Family Leave:
Employer Panel Seeks Streamlining Modifications to FMLA and its Rules, PENSIONS &
BENEFITS DAILY (BNA),June 13, 1997, at D7 [hereinafter Family Leave] (describing
testimony regarding problems complying with and implementing FMLA). But see
Executive Summary, supra note 3 ("Most covered employers find it relatively easy to
administer the FMLA .... A significant majority also find other administrative
responsibilities ... to be no trouble.").
The frustration felt by employers in dealing with the FM[A has lead one com-
mentator to describe the FMLA as a "Frustrating Maze of Legal Aggravation." See
Julie M. Buchanan, Violations List Helps With Family Leave Compliance, MILWAUKEE
SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 1998, at 12 (discussing difficult administration of FMLA). Fur-
ther, the FMLA has been compared to the Internal Revenue Code because of the
FMLA's complicated structure and the thousands of pages of regulations, agency
and court decisions and DOL opinion letters construing the FMLA. See id. ("Com-
pliance [with the FMLA] has been compared to walking through a minefield.").
The DOL responded to this confusion by creating a toll-free number explaining
the law to those who had questions regarding its provisions. See New Labor Depart-
ment Service to Help with FMLA Rights, U.S. NEwswIRE, Jan. 20, 1997, at 1, available in
1997 WL 5710400 [hereinafter Labor Department Service] (discussing new service
available to Americans to help them determine their FMLA rights). Callers will
receive a brief explanation of the FMLA and may elect to get more detailed infor-
mation by mail. See id. ("This toll-free number [1-800-959-FMLA] will provide a
valuable service for workers who need information when the demands of work
collide with the needs of family.").
3
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without jeopardizing their jobs. 6 Interpretative issues abound and the
greatest challenge surrounding this leave has become determining the
threshold requirement for qualifying leave-the existence of a "serious
health condition" sufficient to trigger FMLA protection. 7 Chronic serious
health conditions have particularly frustrated employers who attempt to
manage intermittent leave and somewhat limited notice requirements typ-
ically associated with this type of leave.
8
Employees have routinely defeated employers' motions for summary
judgment by creating genuine issues of fact concerning the seriousness of
their conditions.9 Primarily, this success directly results from the expan-
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (setting forth employees' entitlement to leave).
The FMLA provides that:
Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible employee shall be entitled
to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or
more of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in
order to care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee un-
able to perform the functions of the position of such employee.
Id.
7. See Taffet, supra note 2 ("Over the course of the last few years, courts have
been thrust into the role of medical diagnostician in dozens of cases, examining
the gravity of medical maladies.., even though both Congress and the DOL have
sought to define serious health condition."). Employers argue that the definition
of serious health condition is too expansive and has created increased absenteeism
and loss of control of internal leave policies. See Family Leave, supra note 5, at D7
(summarizing testimony of Thomas Burns, Corporate Director of Benefits and
Compensation for Nynex, in front of Congress that "basically any illness is now
covered by the law"). These employers urge Congress to narrow the definition of
serious health condition and require employees to choose between paid leave or
unpaid FMLA leave. See id. (describing "technical changes" proposed by
employers).
8. See Chronic Serious Health Conditions Under the FMIA, THE FAMILY AND MEDI-
CAL LEAvE HANDBOOK, at 7, May 1997 ("While various aspects of the Family and
Medical Leave Act ... routinely pose administrative challenges for employers,
many of these complications arise together when employees advise that they are
experiencing a chronic serious health condition."); see also Family Leave, supra note
5, at D7 (reiterating urging of panel of employers to streamline FMLA and allevi-
ate administrative difficulties for employers); Executive Summary, supra note 3 ("Un-
like other administrative activities, management of intermittent leave presents an
administrative difficulty for a significant minority of worksites (39.2%), but it rep-
resents a small proportion of leave-taking overall (11.5%)."). For a discussion of
chronic serious health conditions under the FMLA, see infra notes 47-59 and ac-
companying text.
9. See, e.g., Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1239, 1254 (D.
Md. 1997) (determining that employee's chronic condition, coupled with notice
employer had of employee's condition, allowed plaintiff's claim to proceed and
not be dismissed on motion for summary judgment); McClain v. Southwest Steel
Co., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 295, 300 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (denying employer's motion for
4
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sive language, hundreds of pages of legislative history, numerous regula-
tions and opinion letters that guide, and often complicate, the FMLA's
application. 10 Although Congress enacted the FMLA nearly five years ago,
employers continue to grapple with its application and struggle with its
administration.1 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a case of
first impression, addressed FMLA-qualifying chronic serious health condi-
tions in Victorelli v. Shadyside HospitaL12 The court held that where an em-
ployee had been treated several times for a peptic ulcer, before and after
her discharge, there was a material question of fact as to whether the pep-
tic ulcer was a serious health condition invoking FM[A-qualifying leave. 13
The Third Circuit, following the path forged by other circuits, precluded
the employer's motion for summaryjudgment based on the FMLA's broad
terminology and regulations.
14
summary judgment where genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave and provided adequate notice of that leave);
Hendry v. GTE N. Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 827-28 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (precluding
summary judgment because genuine issues of fact existed about whether migraine
headaches of employee gave rise to "serious health condition" where employee was
discharged for absenteeism and it was unclear whether her absences were medi-
cally necessary).
10. See Buchanan, supra note 5, at 12 ("The federal leave law is anything but
simple. There are literally thousands of pages of court and agency decisions, fine
print regulations, interpretive guidance and Labor Department opinion letters.");
see also Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1434-36 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
several FMLA regulations and provisions of FM[A to determine whether plaintiff
satisfied FMLA notice requirement); Thorson v. Gemini Inc., 123 F.3d 1140, 1141-
42 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment based on Dec. 12, 1996 DOL
Opinion Letter stating that minor ailments could rise to serious health condition
in certain circumstances).
11. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 ("[I]n 1997 alone, federal courts have issued
almost 100 decisions stemming from complaints containing FMLA claims."). The
DOL reports a steady increase in complaints alleging employer violations of the
FMLA, with a notable increase in complaints from 1995 to 1996. See id. Consider-
ing the large number of employees covered by the FMLA, the number of claims is
not surprising. See id. (discussing large number of employees having FMLA cover-
age and its effect on litigation). For a discussion of "eligible employees" under the
FMLA, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
12. 128 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1997).
13. See id. at 187 (holding that under FMLA regulations "there is a material
issue as to whether Victorelli suffered from a serious health condition"). For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Victorelli, see infra notes 76-97 and ac-
companying text.
14. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 190 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence
that plaintiff could meet regulatory standard for leave and that factfinder may rea-
sonably find that plaintiff suffers from serious health condition); see also Price v.
City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1027 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that multiple
diagnoses and examinations for conditions only temporarily related to each other
created adequate grounds to overturn employer's award of summary judgment
and order determination of whether plaintiff suffered from serious health condi-
tion); Rhoads, 956 F. Supp. at 1254 (holding that episodic periods of incapacity
involving inability to breathe freely because of asthma and concurrent migraine
headaches were sufficient to preclude summary judgment); McClain, 940 F. Supp.
5
Christenson: Victorelli v. Shadyside Hospital - Chronic Serious Health Conditi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VIuANovA LAW REVIEW
This Casebrief considers the Third Circuit's interpretation of the
FMLA and its provisions in Victorelli.15 First, Part II addresses the FMLA,
its enactment, its accompanying Department of Labor (DOL) regulations
and federal courts' interpretations of the FMLA. 16 Then, Part III tracks
the Third Circuit's interpretation of the FMLA's provisions and discusses
the Third Circuit's advice to employers.17 Finally, Part IV discusses the
implications of the Third Circuit's decision on employers administering
the FMLA's provisions and suggests various ways in which employers may
ease the FMLA's application. 18
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LAVE Ac-r OF 1993
After much political lobbying, President Clinton signed into law the
final version of the FMIA on February 5, 1993.19 Congress based the
at 298-300 (reversing grant of summary judgment where plaintiff suffered from
chronic nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, severe headaches, dizziness and light-
headedness, which might constitute serious health condition); Hendry, 896 F.
Supp. at 827-28 (finding that plaintiff's migraine headaches created material issue
of fact as to whether she suffered from serious health condition).
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Victorelli, see infra notes
76-97 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the FMLA and its accompanying regulations, see infra
notes 19-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how federal courts have
interpreted the FMLA, see infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the FMLA and what
constitutes a serious health condition under the FMLA, see infra notes 76-97 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's advice to employers,
see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the FMLA and the possible effects of the Victorelli deci-
sion on employers, see infra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
19. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 n.1 (discussing background of FMLA). Presi-
dent Clinton wasted no time in signing the FMLA into law - signing the bill only
one day after it was passed by both the House and the Senate. See 139 CONG. REC.
H445-47 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Foley) (declaring congres-
sional approval of FM[A); 139 CONG. REc. S1349-59 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (state-
ment of Rep. Kennedy) (same). The history of the FMLA dates back to the 102d
Congress, where a bill creating family and medical leave was introduced in the
United States House of Representatives by Representative William Clay of Missouri,
and a companion bill was introduced in the United States Senate by Senator Chris-
topher Dodd of Connecticut. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 21 (1993) (discussing history
of FMLA). President Bush, however, vetoed all family leave acts presented to him
and despite a Senate vote to override the veto, the House failed to vote the same.
See 136 CONG. REc. H4451-52 (daily ed July 10, 1990) (reading statement of Presi-
dent Bush, which described failure of prior family leave proposals); 138 CONG.
REc. S14668-69 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (same). President Bush's concerns that
mandating leave policies for American business would create inflexibility and stifle
the country's ability to compete in the international marketplace are virtually iden-
tical to those expressed in the minority views of both the Senate and House Re-
ports. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 49 (describing minority opposition to FMLA). A
new administration under President Clinton supported a similar bill and the
FMLA was placed high on the presidential agenda. See id. After an unsuccessful
attempt to introduce the legislation, Senator Dodd finally introduced what would
become the FMLA on January 21, 1993. See id. (discussing legislative action in
103d Congress). This bill was referred to the Committee on Labor and Human
978 [Vol. 43: p. 973
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FMLA on analogous principles such as those contained in the child labor
laws, the minimum wage laws, Social Security and other labor laws that
provide minimum standards for employment.2 0 All of these laws estab-
lished minimum standards to provide leave for employees in certain family
situations and protect these employees against losing their jobs as a result
of demands outside of the workplace.2 1
Essentially, an employer violates the FMLA if the employer interferes
with, restrains or denies the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any
right provided to an employee under the law. 22 The FMLA's terms re-
Resources, and hearings were conducted by the Subcommittee on Children, Fam-
ily, Drugs and Alcoholism on January 22, 1993. See id. Four days later, the Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources ordered the bill favorably reported
without amendment. See id.
20. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 2 ("The FMLA was drafted with [the principles of
the labor standards] in mind and fits squarely within the tradition of the labor
standards laws that have preceded it .... In drawing on this tradition, the FMLA
proposes a minimum labor standard to address significant new developments in
today's workplace.") Congress reiterated in the FMLA's legislative history its at-
tempt to enact each labor standard law with the needs of the employers in mind.
See id. ("[E]ach law was enacted with the needs of employers in mind. Care was
taken to establish a standard that employers could meet."). Further, Congress en-
acted the civil enforcement provisions of the FMLA to mirror those of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), which has been in ef-
fect since 1938. See id. ("[T]he FMLA creates no new agency or enforcement pro-
cedures, but instead relies on the time-tested FLSA procedures already established
'by the DOL.").
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1994) (codifying purposes of FMLA found in
Senate and House Reports accompanying FMLA). According to Congress, the
purposes of the FMLA are:
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families,
to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to pro-
mote national interests in preserving family integrity;
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for
the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse or
parent who has a serious health condition;
(3) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in a
manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers;
(4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in a
manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for
eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related disability) and for
compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis; and
(5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women
and men, pursuant to such clause.
Id.
22. See id. § 2615(a) (1) (describing prohibited acts under FMLA). The FMLA
also includes a retaliation provision, making it unlawful to discriminate against an
employee for opposing an employer's action that violates the FMLA. See id.
§ 2615(a)(2) (setting forth discrimination provision). Under the FMLA, either
employees or the Secretary of Labor may bring civil actions for damages or injunc-
tive relief against employers. See id. § 2617(a)-(b) (describing employer liability for
violation of FMLA). FMLA penalties are extensive, and in suits brought by employ-
ees they may include lost wages, salary or employment benefits, liquidated dam-
1998]
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quire private employers with fifty or more employees to provide up to
twelve weeks per year of unpaid family and medical leave to eligible em-
ployees.2 3 Not all employees, however, are entitled to FMLA leave; to be-
come eligible, an employee must satisfy the law's minimum length-of-
service and hours-of-work requirements. 24 With a few limited exceptions,
ages, prejudgment interest and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. See id.
§ 2617(a)(1)-(2) (describing rights of employees who bring civil actions against
employers). An employee's right to bring an action, however, terminates once the
DOL files a suit for damages. See id. § 2617(a) (4) (A) (discussing limitations on
employee's right to file suit). As a general rule, class actions may not be filed
under the FMLA; however, an action may be brought by any one or more employ-
ees on behalf of themselves and other employees who are "similarly situated." See
id. § 2617(a) (2) (B) (discussing "right of action" to recover damages or equitable
relief and stating they may be brought on behalf of "the employees and other
employees similarly situated.").
23. See id. § 2612 (addressing leave requirements). The FMLA defines "em-
ployer" as "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each
of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id.
§ 2611(4) (A) (i). This definition of employer includes partnerships, sole proprie-
torships and corporations. See id. § 2611 (4) (B) (stating that "a public agency shall
be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity
affecting commerce"). The FMLA contains a separate provision for civil service
employees, employees of local educational agencies and congressional employees.
See id. § 2618 (describing leave requirements for civil service employees). For a
discussion of when FMLA-eligible employees may take protected leave, see infra
note 26 and accompanying text.
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (defining "eligible employee" as any employee
who has been employed for at least 12 months and who has provided at least 1250
hours of service during previous 12-month period). A determination of whether
an employee has worked for his or her employer for at least 1250 hours in the past
12 months and has been employed for a total of 12 months must be made as of the
date that leave begins. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1998) (stating that if employee
notifies employer of need for FMLA leave before these eligibility requirements are
met, employer must "confirm the employee's eligibility based upon a projection
that the employee will be eligible on the date leave would commence or must
advise the employee when the eligibility requirement is met"). The determination
of the hours-of-service requirement is based on the same legal standards estab-
lished under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (C) ("For purposes of determining
whether an employee meets the hours of service requirement specified in subpara-
graph (A) (ii), the legal standards established under section 207 [of the Fair Labor
Standards Act] shall apply."). Essentially, any employee who has worked for his or
her employer for at least 12 months will be presumed to have worked at least 1250
hours within those 12 months, unless the employer "clearly demonstrates" that the
employee did not meet the eligibility requirements. See Rich v. Delta Air Lines,
921 F. Supp. 767, 773 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (finding that inaccurate records of em-
ployee hours maintained by employer put burden of proving that employee
worked less than 1250 hours on employer). This does not, however, relieve plain-
tiffs from alleging in their pleadings that they worked 1250 hours or more in the
year prior to the challenged leave. See Blidy v. Examination Management Servs.,
No. 96-C-3553, 1996 WL 568786, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (noting that to be
eligible employee under FMLA, employee must have worked at least 1250 hours in
previous 12-month period). Employees should also be aware that the term "hours
worked" does not include time spent on paid or unpaid leave, so these hours
would not count toward satisfying the 1250-hour eligibility threshold. See Robbins
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the FMLA requires employers to restore employees returning from FMLA-
qualifying leave to similar positions upon return to work.
25
The FMLA entities eligible employees to twelve workweeks of unpaid
family medical leave per year for: (1) the birth of the employee's son or
daughter and care of the infant; (2) the placement of a son or daughter
with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) the care of a spouse,
son, daughter or parent of the employee if the spouse, son, daughter or
parent has a serious health condition; or (4) the employee's own serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the func-
tions of his or her job.26 This FMLA protection applies equally to male
and female employees. 2 7 Thus, both a mother and a father may take leave
because of the birth or serious health condition of a child.
28
v. BNA, 896 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1995) (explaining that employee only receives
credit towards FMLA "hours of service" requirement if employee actually works
during hours in question).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (1) (B) (stating that employees taking FMLA leave
are intended "to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment
benefits, pay and other terms and conditions of employment"). According to the
FMLA regulations, however, "An employee has no greater right to reinstatement
or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been
continuously employed during the FMLA leave period." 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a).
One federal court examined the reinstatement issue and concluded that the
FMLA does not require employers to assure returning employees job security that
they would not have been entitled to prior to taking leave. See Lempres v. CBS
Inc., 916 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1996) (examining case where employee de-
manded permanent position upon return from leave even though she had been
employed only under contract for determinable length prior to her leave). Fur-
ther, courts have held that the right to reinstatement can lapse. See Soodman v.
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, at
*27 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1997) (concluding that if employee is unable to return to his
or her position after taking 12 weeks of FMLA-qualifying leave, employee's FM[A
protections expire); Pert v. Value RX, No. 96-CV-73153-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17748, at *7-*8 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1996) (holding that employees who accept
leave beyond 12 weeks required by FMLA give up their right to be reinstated in
their previous positions). In these situations, the right to reinstatement never
arises because the employee is not eligible to return under the terms of the FMLA.
See Soodman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, at *27 (explaining that employee who
cannot perform essential functions of former position due to continued serious
health condition does not have right to be placed in other positions).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (describing leave requirements). The leave man-
dated by the FMLA is unpaid, although the "employee may elect, or an employer
may require" that paid leave, such as vacation or personal leave, is substituted as
FMLA leave. See id. §§ 2612(c), 2612(d) (2) (A)-(B) (describing leave substitution).
27. See S. RP. No. 103-3, at 24 ("The right to leave applies equally to male
and female employees.").
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (stating that leave requirements apply to all
eligible employees). If a husband and wife are employed by the same employer,
however, and both are entitled to leave because of the birth or placement of a
child or to care for a sick parent, the aggregate family leave for both is limited to
12 weeks. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 92 (detailing limitations on employee leave).
Under this provision, the entitlement to leave expires at the end of the 12-month
period commencing on the date of the birth or placement of the employee's child.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2) (describing expiration of entitlement to leave).
9
Christenson: Victorelli v. Shadyside Hospital - Chronic Serious Health Conditi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 973
The FMLA requires that an employee who foresees the need for leave
notify his or her employer thirty days prior to the commencement of his
or her leave. 29 Leave necessitated by a family member's or the employee's
own serious health condition, however, may be taken on an intermittent
or reduced schedule basis if "medically necessary." 30 Generally, if the
need for leave is unforeseeable, the employee must provide "such notice
as is practicable."3 1 In addition to these procedural requirements, the
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (1) (discussing requirement of notice for foresee-
able leave). Examples of employees who can foresee the need for leave are those
anticipating the birth or adoption of a child. See id. Employees are also required
to notify their employers of leave for planned medical treatment. See id.
§ 2612(e) (2) (outlining duties of employees to employers). Not only must em-
ployees give notice under the FMLA, employers must also notify employees of their
FMLA rights and obligations. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (1998) (discussing
mandatory requirement on employers to inform employees of their FMLA rights
and obligations). This notice includes posting signs in conspicuous places and
providing notice of the FMLA's provisions and information concerning the proce-
dures for filing a complaint. See id. (requiring employers to notify employees of
their FMLA rights regardless of whether employer has eligible employees). If an
employer fails to satisfy this notice requirement, he or she may be assessed a fine
and, more importantly, cannot take any adverse action against any employee for
failing to provide the advance notice needed for FMLA leave. See id. § 825.300(b)
(discussing ramifications to employers for failing to satisfy posting requirement);
see also id. § 825.300(c) (requiring that employers having significant portion of
non-English speaking employees provide notice in employees' literate language).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (1) (setting forth requirements for leave taken in-
termittently or on reduced leave schedule). For the birth or adoption of a son or
daughter, employees may take leave on an intermittent or reduced leave schedule
only if both the employer and employee agree to this arrangement. See id.
(describing parameters of intermittent leave and specifically excluding leave taken
for birth or adoption of children from being taken on intermittent basis without
both employer and employee consent). This intermittent leave may be taken in
increments of an hour to a full day. See id. ("The taking of leave intermittently or
on a reduced leave schedule ... shall not result in a reduction in the total amount
of leave to which the employee is entitled under subsection (a) of this section
beyond the amount of leave actually taken.").
31. See id. § 2612(e) (2) (B) (excepting typical notice requirements "if the date
of the treatment requires leave to begin in less than 30 days" and in this case "the
employee shall provide such notice as is practicable"). The regulations provide,
however, that an "employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or
even mention the FMLA" in his or her request for leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c).
This places a heavy burden on the employer to determine what type of leave the
employee is requesting and for what types of leave the employee is actually eligible
(e.g., FMLA leave, paid sick leave under the employer's plan or both). See Gay v.
Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that once notice is
given, it is employer's duty to make further inquiry and determine whether leave is
qualified for FMLA protection); Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1026
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that "FMLA does not require that an employee give notice
of a desire to invoke the FMLA," but that "notice is given when the employee
requests leave for a covered reason" and after this notice is given "the employer
can inquire further to determine if the FMLA applies"); Manuel v. Westlake
Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that eligible employee
may implicitly invoke FMLA by notifying his or her employer of need for leave
created by serious health condition).
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most critical determination in evaluating FMLA-protected leave is the
existence of a serious health condition, as defined under the FMLA. 32
A. FMLA-Qualifying "Serious Health Condition"
Under the fourth FMLA-qualifying condition, employees may take
FMIA-protected leave for their own serious health condition.33 The test
for entitlement to this sort of leave is two-fold: first, the employee must be
unable to perform the essential functions of his or her position, and sec-
ond, the inability to perform those functions must be the result of a seri-
ous health condition. 34 A serious health condition is defined in the FMLA
as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that in-
volves ... inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care
facility; or ... continuing treatment by a health care provider."35 The
terms of this definition are further clarified in the legislative history, the
interpretive regulations and DOL letter rulings, which accompany the
FMLA.
1. Congress' Definition of Serious Health Condition
In the FMLA's legislative history, Congress identified a varied list of
ailments that, although not exhaustive, was intended to illustrate medical
conditions warranting FMLA protection. 36 Through this list, Congress
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (explaining which serious health conditions entitle
employees to FMLA leave).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1) (D) (defining employee's entitlement to leave
because of serious health condition).
34. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 103-8 (1993) ("The test.., is two-fold: [flirst, is the
employee 'unable to perform the functions of such employee's position?' And sec-
ond, is the inability to perform those functions due to a serious health condi-
tion?"); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 106 (D.R.I.
1997) (concluding that plaintiff was unable to show that he suffered from serious
health condition because his condition did not prevent him from performing his
job); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Comm., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 475-76 (D. Kan. 1996)
(finding where plaintiff failed to present medical evidence that condition required
her to be out of work and medical evidence was contrary to such finding, that
plaintiff failed, as matter of law, to prove she suffered from serious health condi-
tion); Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D. Tenn.
1995) (holding that plaintiffs condition did not rise to level of serious health con-
dition where plaintiffs doctor never advised plaintiff to remain off from work, but
simply stated that it was reasonable for plaintiff to do so).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (A)-(B). The FMLA regulations adopt the defini-
tions of "physical or mental disability" that are incorporated in the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) regulations that apply to the American's
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). See RICHARD L. MAR-
cus, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAvE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 50 (1994) (discussing
ADA definition of "physical or mental disability").
36. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 29 (1993) (listing conditions or illnesses that are
considered serious health conditions and will entitle employees to FMLA leave).
These illness and conditions include:
[H]eart attacks, heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve opera-
tions, most cancers, back conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgi-
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sought to differentiate ordinary and sporadic illnesses and conditions
from more serious conditions that would qualify for FMLA protection.
3 7
Essentially, Congress protected illnesses and conditions requiring an ab-
sence from work on a recurring basis or for more than a few days for
treatment or recovery. 38
In addition to the legislative history's definition, serious health condi-
tion is also defined in the FMLA's accompanying regulations, promul-
gated by the DOL.39 Interim regulations were published in June 1993 and
after reviewing public comments, the DOL issued final regulations, which
took effect on April 6, 1995.40 Today, these regulations are the dominant
source of interpretative guidance for employers and courts administering
the FMLA.
4 1
cal procedures, strokes, severe respiratory conditions, spinal injuries,
appendicitis, pneumonia, emphysema, severe arthritis, severe nervous dis-
orders, injuries caused by serious accidents on or off the job, ongoing
pregnancy, miscarriages, complications or illnesses related to pregnancy,
such as severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal care, childbirth
and recovery from childbirth.
Id. Congress found that all of these conditions meet a general test of requiring the
employee to be absent from work "on a recurring basis or for more than a few days
for treatment or recovery." Id.
37. See id. at 28 ("The term 'serious health condition' is not intended to cover
short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief.").
38. See id. (discussing meaning of serious health condition under FMLA).
39. See 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1998). Congress, in Title IV of the FMLA, empow-
ered the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994) ("The Secretary of Labor
shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out subchapter I of this
chapter and this subchapter not later than 120 days after February 5, 1993.").
40. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 2, at 62 (listing changes and clarifications
made to interim regulations). The DOL changed the interim regulations follow-
ing lengthy commentary by employers and commentators. See id. (stating that
DOL changed or clarified provisions concerning definition of serious health con-
dition). Many, however, found the final regulations to only be lengthier, more
complicated and harder to apply. See id. ("[T]he [final] regulations certainly do
not make administration of FMLA any easier for employers."). But see Deborah
Shalowitz Cowans, Employer Concerns Find a Voice in FMLA Regulations Conditions for
Leave Clarified, Bus. INS., Jan. 16, 1995, at 2 (quoting one commentator as saying
that DOL did "a good job in responding to some of the concerns of some com-
mentators" in defining serious health condition).
41. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 ("[E]ven well before their effective date,
courts relied upon and cited the regulations approvingly."); RebeccaJ. Wilson &
William V. Hoch, Using Case Law and Strategies to Defend Family and Medical Leave Act
Claims, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 534, 535-46 (1997) (giving advice to defense attorneys
defending FMLA cases and citing regulations as integral in interpreting FMLA); see
also Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that
where FMLA is silent, regulations provide guidance in defining its terms); Thorson
v. Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140, 1141 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing regulatory criteria as
means of interpreting FMLA provisions); Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119
F.3d 330, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing regulations to clarify terms found in
FMLA's provisions); Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1023-24 (7th Cir.
1997) (citing labor regulations' definition of serious health condition as dominant
means of determining whether employee is entitled to FMLA rights).
[Vol. 43: p. 973
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The DOL's interim regulations govern alleged FMLA violations that
occurred prior to April 6, 1995.42 FMILA leave taken before this date is not
held to the standards established by the final regulations. 43 Courts, how-
ever, have cited the final regulations as an interpretative aid for the in-
terim regulations. 44 Consequently, the final regulations pertain to FMLA
allegations occurring before April 6, 1995. 4 5 Because the interim regula-
tions are altered by the final regulations in various significant ways, it is
important to be aware of the date that the FMLA action occurred and the
provisions of both regulations.
4 6
2. The FMLA Regulations' Definition of Serious Health Condition
The DOL, consistent with Congress' intention, drafted the interim
regulations to provide FMLA-protected leave for a multitude of physical
and mental conditions or illnesses.4 7 These regulations define serious
health condition as any injury, illness, impairment, or physical or mental
42. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 534-35 (discussing application of
interim and final regulations). The FMLA does not expressly direct which set of
regulations apply in different circumstances; however, one court has noted that
"'[r] egulations, like statutes, cannot be applied retroactively absent express direc-
tion to do so."' Id. at 534 (quoting Robbins v. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 896
F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1995)).
43. See Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The
course of events and applicable facts in the instant case occurred before the final
regulations were adopted and therefore we find that the interim final rule governs
in this case."); Gay, 125 F.3d at 1434 (applying interim regulations to serious
health condition and termination occurring in June 1994); Marathon Cheese, 119
F.3d at 334 n.12 (finding that interim regulations apply to help clarify what is
meant by serious health condition where employee's claim arose before effective
date of final regulations); Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109,
1111 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that interim regulations govern instant case); Ma-
nuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
interim regulations to dispute arising before release of final regulations).
44. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 186 ("[W]e will refer to the final rule ... as an aid
to interpret the interim final rule."); United States Steel Corp. v. Oravetz, 686 F.2d
197, 201 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that claims filed before effective date of final rules
should be interpreted by final rules to extent that it is appropriate).
45. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 186 (analyzing plaintiff's case under both interim
and final regulations).
46. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 534-35 (urging defense counsel to be
aware of different instances where interim and final regulations would apply to
FMLA action).
47. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 630 & 890 (1998) (discussing Congress' intention behind
term "serious health condition"). Some commentators argue that the DOL has
taken a broad view of its rule-making ability and unduly expanded FMLA coverage
to circumstances it was not intended to address. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 2,
at 1 ("The Labor Department has taken a very expansive view of this rulemaking
authority in attempting to apply the FMLA to myriad circumstances not specifically
addressed by Congress in the statute."). Further, this expansive interpretation may
force employers to determine the effects of the regulations on employee manuals
and existing company policies before the courts have the opportunity to interpret
them. See id. (describing possible effects of expansive regulations on employers
and professionals).
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condition that involves either inpatient care, absence for three calendar
days or continuing treatment by, or under, the supervision of a htalth care
provider.48 This definition mirrors the FMLA's definition. 49
The interim regulations, however, also define a serious health condi-
tion as one that requires "continuing treatment by a health care pro-
vider."50 To satisfy the interim regulations' requirements, this condition
would include either an absence for more than three calendar days or an
absence for prenatal care. 5 1 The regulations cite Alzheimer's, severe
strokes or persons in the terminal stages of a disease as examples of seri-
ous health conditions. 52 Additionally, one portion of this definition man-
dates that the condition be long-term, chronic or incurable. 53
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (1998) (defining serious health condition).
The interim regulations specifically define serious health condition as a condition
involving:
1. Any period of incapacity or treatment in connection with or conse-
quent to inpatient care (i.e. an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or
residential medical care facility;
2. Any period of incapacity requiring absence from work, school, or
other regular daily activities, of more than three calendar days, that also
involves continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health
care provider; or
3. Continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care
provider for a chronic or long-term health condition that is incurable or
so serious that, if not treated, would likely result in a period of incapacity
of more than three calendar dates; or for prenatal care.
Id.
49. Compare id. (defining serious health condition), with 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (11)
(1994) (defining serious health condition). For a discussion of the FMLA's defini-
tion, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b). The interim regulations define "continuing treat-
ment by a health care provider" as meaning one of the following:
1. The employee or family member in question is treated two or more
times for the injury or illness by a health care provider. Normally this
would require visits to the health care provider or to a nurse or physi-
cian's assistant under direct supervision of the health care provider.
2. The employee or family member is treated for the injury or illness two
or more times by a provider of health care services (e.g., physical thera-
pist) under orders of, oron referral by, a health care provider on at least
one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under
the supervision of the health care provider-for example, a course of
medication or therapy-to resolve the health condition.
3. The employee or family member is under the continuing supervision
of, but not necessarily being actively treated by a health care provider due
to a serious long-term or chronic condition or disability which cannot be
cured ....
Id.
51. See id. § 825.114(a)(3) (specifying requirements for serious health
condition).
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (3) (citing these conditions as examples of
those not necessitating active medical treatment, but still eligible for FMLA
protection).
53. See id. (requiring that employee's condition be "serious long-term or
chronic condition or disability [that] cannot be cured").
[Vol. 43: p. 973
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The definition of serious health condition as set forth in the interim
regulations remains largely unaltered in the final regulations. 54 After con-
sidering employer criticism and recommendations, the DOL augmented
conditions qualifying an employee for FMLA leave and redefined what
constitutes a "chronic health condition."5 5 In addition to eliminating the
three day requirement for incapacity, the DOL no longer requires that the
chronic condition be incurable or long-term to be considered a serious
health condition. 56 Instead, the final regulations provide a list of minor
ailments that would not constitute serious health conditions unless certain
54. See id. § 825.114 (defining serious health condition). The final regula-
tions define a serious health condition as any illness, injury, impairment or physi-
cal or mental condition involving:
1. Inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice or resi-
dential medical care facility, including any period of incapacity (for pur-
poses of this section, defined to mean inability to work, attend school or
perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition,
treatment therefor or recovery therefrom), or any subsequent treatment
in connection with such inpatient care; or
2. Continuing treatment by a health care provider ....
Id.; see Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1024 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that results of employee's claim were identical under either interim or
final regulations).
55. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (2) (i) (B) (defining continuing treatment by
health care provider). The regulations define continuing treatment by a health
care provider as "[tireatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion
which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of a
health care provider." Id. Further, the regulations provide that this definition may
include "[a]ny period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a
chronic serious health condition." Id. § 825.114(a) (2) (i) (B) (iii). The final regu-
lations define chronic serious health condition as a condition that:
A. Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or by a
nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care
provider;
B. Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring epi-
sodes of a single underlying condition); and
C. May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity ....
Id. § 825.114(a) (2) (iii). The DOL received over 900 comments from 1993 to
1995, the two years since the interim regulations governed the FMLA. See Cowans,
supra note 40, at 2, 39-40 (describing changes in regulations). Specifically, the
DOL received 88 comments regarding the definition of serious health condition,
some stating the definition was too broad and others saying it was too narrow. See
id. ("Earlier guidance on what constitutes a serious illness generated 88 comments,
some of which said the definition was too broad, others that it was too
restrictive.").
56. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (2) (providing that asthma, diabetes or epilepsy
may be examples of chronic health conditions causing episodic incapacity). The
final regulations do, however, provide examples of conditions meeting certain re-
quirements of serious health condition throughout the definition. See id.
§ 825.114(a) (2) (v) (providing that cancer, severe arthritis and kidney disease are
examples of conditions requiring multiple treatments by health care provider).
These health conditions cause "episodic incapacity" rather than incapacity mea-
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complications arose.5 7 When complications do develop, those conditions
may constitute FMLA-qualifying "chronic health conditions."58 The DOL,
however, did not define "complications" in the regulations.5 9
3. The DOL's Clarification of What Constitutes a Serious Health Condition
In a recent opinion letter, the DOL opined that minor conditions
may rise to the level of a serious health condition in certain circum-
stances. 60 On December 12, 1996, the Wage and Hour Division of the
DOL pronounced that minor ailments mentioned in the final regulations
may satisfy the regulatory criteria for serious health condition and, there-
fore, enjoy FMLA protection. 6 1 These minor conditions include the com-
mon cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach and minor ulcers.62
This decision is significant because it overrules an earlier determina-
tion that minor conditions could not constitute serious health conditions
57. See id. § 825.114(c) ("Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common
cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than mi-
graine, routine dental or orthodontia problems, periodontal disease, etc. are ex-
amples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a serious health condition
and do not qualify for FMLA leave."). For a discussion of the letter ruling issued
interpreting this portion of the regulations, see infra notes 60-64 and accompany-
ing text.
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (noting that certain conditions are not in-
cluded unless "complications develop").
59. See id. (providing only laundry list of minor ailments); see also Victorelli v.
Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that although final
regulations say that "unless complications arise" minor ulcers are not covered by
FMLA, final regulations "fail[ ] to indicate what complications distinguish a serious
ulcer from a minor one"). For a discussion of the DOL letter ruling clarifying
somewhat the dispute over what complications will change a minor condition into
a serious health condition, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
60. See Ltr. Rul. (FMLA-86) (Dec. 12, 1996) (answering questions regarding
what constitutes serious health condition for FMLA-qualifying leave). The courts
defer to DOL opinion letters when there is an issue raised in a case that the opin-
ion addresses. See Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140, 1141 (8th Cir. 1997)
(deferring to Dec. 12, 1996 DOL opinion letter.and giving parties additional
chance to argue that plaintiff meets FMLA requirements); see also Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (reiterat-
ing long-standing principle that "considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to admin-
ister" and that "understanding of the force of the statutory policy . .. has de-
pended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations").
61. See Ltr. Rul. (FMLA-86) (discussing FMLA regulations surrounding seri-
ous health condition).
62. See id. (including "headaches other than migraine, routine dental or or-
thodontia problems, periodontal disease, etc."). These conditions would not ordi-
narily satisfy the requirements of serious health condition because they typically do
not last for more than three consecutive days and require continuing treatment by
a health care provider. See id. (noting that these conditions would not be expected
to last longer than three days).
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by satisfying regulatory criteria.63 With this new letter ruling, an employee
suffering from almost any condition may be afforded 'FMIA protection
based on the regulatory requirements for serious health condition. If that
employee can successfully argue that complications surrounding his or her
minor ailment raise it to the level of a serious health condition, he or she
will be entitled to leave under the FMLA.64
B. Federal Courts Interpret the FMLA
Faced with inconsistent interpretations of serious health condition,
employers and employees have frequently disagreed over what conditions
qualify for FMLA protection.65 A majority of FMLA claims ensue after an
employer refuses to reinstate an employee after that employee takes what
he or she perceives to be FMIA-protected leave. 66 This conflict has thrust
the judiciary into the role of medical diagnostician, as courts attempt to
determine what constitutes a serious health condition under the FMLA.67
Included among the nonqualifying ailments are food poisoning, shortness
63. See id. (discussing rescinded letter expressing view that employee incapaci-
tated for more than three days and treated at least once by health care provider,
which results in regimen of continuing treatment prescribed by health care pro-
vider, may not have FMLA-qualifying serious health condition).
64. See Thorson, 123 F.3d at 1141-42 (determining that employee's stomach
condition may fall within FMLA coverage as result of complications surrounding
it). In Thorson, the plaintiff left work and went to the hospital with stomach
trouble, which a doctor determined to be acute gastritis and a possible peptic ul-
cer. See id. at 1140. The doctor prescribed ulcer medication and ordered Thorson
to stay at home for four days. See id. Ultimately, after further testing, it was deter-
mined that Thorson suffered from a small hiatal hernia and mild antral gastritis,
but by this time Gemini had fired Thorson for violating the company's attendance
policy. See id. at 1140-41 (stating that according to Gemini's attendance policy,
employee's tolerated absences were limited to five percent of his or her scheduled
hours, including absences due to illness, and Thorson exhausted limit). For a
comparison of Thorson to the Third Circuit's opinion in Victorelli, see infra note 82.
65. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 ("Decisions construing the FMLA have been
concentrated overwhelmingly in the interpretation of a threshold requirement for
qualifying leave: the existence of a serious health condition sufficient to trigger the
Act's benefits."); Family Leave, supra note 5, at D7 (discussing that problem for
employers lies mostly in interpretation of serious health condition).
66. See Labor Department Service, supra note 5, at 1 ("The Department of Labor's
latest enforcement report found that most complaints resulted from an employer
refusing to reinstate an employee to the same or equivalent job after taking time
off."). The DOL, however, found that 90% of these complaints were successfully
resolved with the employer's agreement to comply with the FMLA. See id. (stating
that compliance required only simple phone call from DOL).,
67. See Taffet, supra note 2, at 1 ("[C]ourts have been thrust into the role of
medical diagnostician in dozens of cases, examining the gravity of medical mala-
dies ranging from chicken pox to food poisoning to ingrown toenails, even though
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of breath and chest pains, stomach virus, carpal tunnel syndrome, si-
nobronchitis, discomfort and distress.68
The failure to establish a genuine need for continuing treatment has
led many courts to rule against employees who may have an otherwise pro-
tected ailment.69 For example, in Seidle v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance,
Co.,70 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found that an ear infection suffered by an employee's son did not
qualify the employee for FMLA leave for two reasons. 71 First, the child was
seen by a physician only once, and second, the child did not take any
medication under the doctor's continuing supervision. 72 The court in
68. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment where plaintiff suffered from carpal tunnel syn-
drome); Boyce v. New York City Mission Soc'y, 963 F. Supp. 290, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (refusing to qualify shortness of breath and chest pains as serious health
condition); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 999 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (refusing plaintiff's claim that stomach virus was serious health condition);
Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1128 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that
sinobronchitis does not constitute serious health condition); Gudenkauf v. Stauf-
fer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 474-76 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that
routine pregnancy discomfort is not serious health condition); Brannon v. Osh-
kosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding that gas-
troenteritis and upper respiratory tract infection did not meet requirements for
serious health condition); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253, 259 (N.D.
Miss. 1995) (refusing to declare food poisoning as serious health condition), aff'd,
74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recently held that rectal bleeding that did not cause a three-day ab-
sence from work or cause an employee to seek or receive inpatient care did not
constitute an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition. See Bauer v. Varity Day-
ton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109, 1111-13 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing to qualify
plaintiff's condition as serious health condition). But see Marathon Cheese, 119 F.3d
at 334 (acknowledging that "carpal tunnel syndrome, if sufficiently severe, can be a
serious health condition"). For a discussion of when a minor ailment may rise to
the level of a serious health condition, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying
text.
69. See Sakellarion v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 800, 807 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (ruling that employer did not violate FMLA by terminating employee who
alleged that absences resulted from need to care for adult daughter suffering from
asthma attack). In Sakellarion, the court found that the employee never established
that her daughter required continuing treatment after she was discharged from
the hospital. See id. (refusing to apply FMLA). FromJanuary 1993 toJanuary 1994,
the plaintiff was often absent from work without having scheduled the absences in
advance. See id. at 803 (stating that these absences were for extended periods of
time).
70. 871 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
71. See id. at 243-45 (establishing that no serious health condition existed).
72. See id. at 246 (holding that although untreated ear infection potentially
could lead to serious complications, simple ear infection was not serious health
condition). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
also found that a determination of whether the plaintiff's health condition was
serious had to be made during the period in which the leave was requested. See
Bauer v. Dayton-Walther Corp., 910 F. Supp. 306, 311 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (refusing to
apply FMLA based on potential seriousness of plaintiffs ailment), affd, 118 F.3d
1109 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Seidle reasoned that including conditions that could potentially evolve into
a serious health condition would conflict with the goals of the FMIA.73
Although the number of cases interpreting the FMLA has increased,
relatively few of these cases have involved chronic serious health condi-
tions.74 In those cases pertaining to chronic serious health conditions,
one theme emerges-employers experience great difficulty having the
cases dismissed at the summary judgment stage. 75 Although these did not
constitute final judgments against the employer, each denial allowed the
case to continue, representing significant victories against employers.
III. VcTORELLi v. SADYSIDA' HOSPTAL: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
OF CHRONIC SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITIONS
In Victorelli, the Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment
in favor of an employer, finding sufficient evidence that the plaintiff may
suffer from a "chronic serious health condition."76 According to the
court, the interim regulations did not preclude Victorelli's peptic ulcer
from meeting the criteria for a serious health condition. 77 Specifically,
the court disagreed with the district court's narrow interpretation of the
regulations and found sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Victorelli's condition satisfied the portion of the regulations requiring
continuing treatment by a health care provider. 78 Furthermore, the Third
73. See Seidle, 871 F. Supp. at 246 (determining that FMLA was not meant "to
include conditions which although minor in their initial stages, could evolve into
serious illnesses," as that "would bring within the protections of the statute virtually
every common malady.., which is in direct conflict with Congress' intention to
exclude from the protections of the FMLA minor illnesses . . ").
74. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 534 (acknowledging growing body of
FMLA case law).
75. See Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1239, 1255-56 (D.
Md. 1997) (determining that employee's chronic condition allowed plaintiffs
claim to proceed and not be dismissed on motion for summary judgment); Mc-
Clain v. Southwest Steel Co., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (de-
termining that plaintiffs claim that he suffered from chronic nausea, diarrhea,
vomiting, severe headaches, dizziness and lightheadedness, coupled with continu-
ing treatment for these conditions, precluded employer's motion for summary
judgment).
76. SeeVictorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting
that plaintiff may meet regulatory standard).
77. See id. (commenting on intent of FMLA). The Third Circuit refused to
deny FMLA benefits if "the doctor was able to mitigate the frequency of [plain-
tiffs] pain." Id. Therefore, this included sufferers of occasional and continual
incapacity within FMLA protection. See id. (opining that FMLA protection should
not be withheld simply because medication is available to ease employee's pain).
78. See id. at 187 (disagreeing with district court's narrow construction of reg-
ulations). The district court read the interim regulations as having only two plausi-
ble readings of the term serious health condition-one that included Victorelli's
condition and one that did not. See id. (discussing two interpretations of serious
health condition). Therefore, finding the statute ambiguous, the district court re-
lied on the legislative history and the final regulations for guidance. See id. (analyz-
ing FMLA and its history). The court interpreted Victorelli's ulcer as the type of
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Circuit concluded that the same result would occur under both the in-
terim and final regulations of the FMLA.71
A. The Third Circuit's Interpretation of the FMLA Regulations
In Victorelli, the Third Circuit thoroughly analyzed the FMLA's in-
terim regulations as they applied to the plaintiff's alleged FMLA-protected
leave.80 The court correctly followed the district court in applying the
interim regulations, not the final regulations, to Victorelli's case. 81 After
applying the interim regulations, the court found that Victorelli's condi-
tion was not "minor" as a matter of law and thus refused to grant the em-
ployer summary judgment.8 2
condition that Congress intended to be exempt from FMLA coverage and "treated
pursuant to an employer's sick leave policy." See id. (finding it more appropriate to
apply sick leave).
79. See id. at 189 ("After comparing the interim and the final rules, we note
that the standard for continuing treatment has remained unchanged."). Other
circuits have also concluded that the threshold requirements for leave are the
same under the interim and final regulations. See, e.g., Price v. City of Fort Wayne,
117 F.3d 1022, 1024 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (analyzing only interim regulations to
avoid repeating what would be same analysis under final regulations). This deter-
mination by the Third Circuit is pertinent to employers because the final regula-
tions would apply to alleged FMLA violations occurring after the enactment of the
final regulations. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 186 (finding that course of events occur-
ring before final regulations were released are governed by interim regulations
and those occurring after enactment of final regulations are governed by those
regulations). For a discussion of the interim and final regulations, see supra notes
39-59 and accompanying text.
80. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 186 (reiterating definition of serious health condi-
tion under interim regulations); see also Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140,
1141 (8th Cir. 1997) (deferring to legislature and DOL and deciding it would be
prudent to reverse grant of summaryjudgment because employee's minor ailment
could rise to level of serious health condition under DOL regulations). For a dis-
cussion of how the interim regulations define serious health conditions, see supra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
81. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 186 ("The course of events and applicable facts in
the instant case occurred before the final regulations were adopted and therefore
we find that the interim final rule governs this case."). The parties in Victorelli did
not dispute the application of the interim regulations to the case. See id. (agreeing
with district court's application of interim regulations); see also Bauer v. Varity Day-
ton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying interim regula-
tions to disputes occurring before release of final regulations); Manuel v. Westlake
Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (analyzing plaintiff's claim
under interim regulations as defendant's decision to suspend plaintiff occurred
prior to issuance of final regulations). The Third Circuit did, however, use the
final regulations as an aid in interpreting the interim regulations. See Victorelli, 128
F.3d at 186 (applying final regulations for comparison). For a discussion of when
the interim and final regulations apply in FMLA cases, see supra notes 42-46 and
accompanying text.
82. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 (finding it premature to award summaryjudg-
ment to Shadyside because of evidence in record to support conclusion that
Victorelli suffered from long-term, chronic or incurable condition). In its deci-
sion, the Third Circuit did not rely on the DOL's letter ruling, which was relied on
by the Eighth Circuit in Thorson. Compare id. at 187-91 (using only FMLA's legisla-
992 [Vol. 43: p. 973
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Both the Third Circuit and the district court agreed that Victorelli was
an eligible employee under the FMLA.8 3 Therefore, the FMLA entitled
Victorelli to protected leave for her own serious health condition.8 4 The
Third Circuit concluded that Victorelli's peptic ulcer might qualify for
FMLA-protected leave based on the interim regulations' three-part defini-
tion of serious health condition. 5 Specifically, the court determined that
Victorelli's condition could involve continuing treatment by a health care
provider.8
6
In the interim regulations, "continuing treatment by a health care
provider" requires in part that the employee be treated two or more times
for his or her condition by a health care provider.87 The Third Circuit
found that Victorelli's condition satisfied this requirement because she
was treated by her doctor twice, in addition to treatment subsequent to
her termination.88
tive history and accompanying regulations to determine whether plaintiff suffered
from serious health condition), with Thorson, 123 F.3d at 1141 .(relying on Decem-
ber 12, 1996 letter ruling to support conclusion that employee's illness may consti-
tute serious health condition even though it is commonly considered minor in
nature). It is interesting to note that the plaintiff in Thorson suffered from a condi-
tion similar to Victorelli's. Compare id. at 1140-41 (discussing Thorson's original
diagnosis of peptic ulcer and final diagnosis of small hiatial hernia and mild antral
gastritis and duodenitis), with Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 (discussing Victorelli's visits
to doctor for gastritis and symptoms of peptic ulcer disease).
83. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 187 (agreeing with district court that Victorelli
was eligible employee according to terms of FMLA).
84. See id. at 186 (finding that under FMLA, "eligible" employees are allowed
to take up to 12 weeks of leave and that FMLA applies when employee's own seri-
ous health condition makes him or her unable to perform functions of his or her
job); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1) (D) (1994) (detailing when employee may take
leave for his or her own serious health condition); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (1998) (de-
fining entitlement to leave for eligible employees). For a discussion of the qualifi-
cations and characteristics of FMLA leave, see supra notes 33-59 and accompanying
text.
85. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 187 (stating that "construction of the interim final
rule convince [d] [the court] that there [was] a material issue as to whether
Victorelli suffered from a serious health condition").
86. See id. at 188-89 (finding evidence suggesting that Victorelli's condition
satisfied three-part definition of "continuing treatment").
87. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b)(1) (1993) ("The employee or family member
in question is treated two or more times for the injury or illness by a health care
provider.") The regulation goes on to say that "[n]ormally this would require visits
to the health care provider or to a nurse or physician's assistant under direct super-
vision of the health care provider." Id.
88. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 187-88 (discussing requirements of section
825.114(b)(1) of interim regulations' definition of "continuing treatment by a
health care provider"). Victorelli began seeing a doctor for her ulcer on March 16,
1988. See id. at 185. In March of 1990, she was diagnosed with gastritis and began
treatment for her recurring stomach pain. See id. Victorelli saw the same doctor
again twice in 1992 due to stomach pain and additional symptoms of nausea and
vomiting. See id. During this time, she was diagnosed with a peptic ulcer and was
prescribed Zantac for her condition. See id. Victorelli's doctor treated her on June
23, 1993, August 2, 1994, May 30, 1995 and November 16, 1995, after finding that
the prescription was not controlling the ulcer. See id.
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The second portion of this definition requires treatment for the con-
dition on at least one occasion, as well as "continuing treatment" by the
health care provider.89 Because continuing treatment, as defined by the
regulations, includes "a course of medication or therapy," the Third Cir-
cuit found that Victorelli's prescription for medicine written by her doctor
and her several visits to his office fulfilled this portion of the definition. 90
Finally, the Third Circuit discussed the third portion of the interim
regulations' definition not addressed by the district court.9 1 This section
requires that the employee be under the continuing supervision of a
health care provider for an incurable serious long-term or chronic condi-
tion.92 The Third Circuit found that Victorelli's repeated visits to her doc-
tor, coupled with his determination that Victorelli's condition was
incurable, although manageable with medication, provided evidence that
her condition may satisfy this portion of the regulation.9 3 Therefore, the
court found that Victorelli demonstrated a material issue of fact as to
whether her peptic ulcer was an FMLA-qualifying serious health
condition.9 4
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (2) (requiring that employee be "treated for the
injury or illness by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in
a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care pro-
vider... to resolve the health condition"). Examples of continuing treatment by a
health care provider cited in the interim regulations include participating in a
course of medication or therapy. See id. (citing physical therapy as example).
90. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 ("Victorelli's condition satisfies (b) (2), be-
cause she was treated by Dr. Adoki on at least one occasion and subsequently re-
ceived continuing treatment by medication for her condition."). The Third
Circuit determined that this conclusion did not require an expansive reading of
the FMLA interim regulations, as suggested by the district court. See id. (disagree-
ing with district court's interpretation of FMLA regulations). Rather, the court
concluded that the district court "construed the requirements of the interim final
rule too narrowly." Id. at 187.
91. See id. at 188 (finding its construction of interim regulations to be
'neither improper nor unduly expansive"). The district court did not even reach
analysis of this portion of the interim regulations because it found that Victorelli's
condition failed to satisfy (b) (1) and (b) (2) of the definition of continuing treat-
ment by a health care provider. See id. (noting that "the district court at no time
addressed whether subsection (b) (3) applied to Victorelli's condition"). The dis-
trict court based its findings on the final regulations and the legislative history of
the FMLA. See id. at 186-90 (citing regulations as main source of interpretive gui-
dance for cases involving FMLA).
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (3) (providing that requirement does not neces-
sarily require active treatment by health care provider). The regulations cite
Alzheimer's, persons suffering a severe stroke or persons in terminal stages of a
disease who may not be receiving active medical treatment as examples of this
requirement. See id. (noting that active treatment is not mandatory).
93. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 ("There is evidence that Victorelli's peptic
ulcer disease appears to be a long-term or chronic condition.").
94. See id. (concluding that it was "premature to award summary judgment to
Shadyside on Victorelli's FMLA claim"). The court did not, however, determine
the issue of whether Victorelli was terminated for taking FMLA protected leave.
See id. at 186 (stating that two issues required attention: first, whether Victorelli
suffered from serious health condition under FMLA, and second, whether she was
[Vol. 43: p. 973
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In making this determination, the court opined that the FMLA pro-
tects not only those conditions that cause continual incapacity, but also
those conditions creating periods of occasional incapacity. 95 Such chronic
conditions are expressly included in the FMLA regulations' definition of
serious health condition and are thus afforded FMLA protection.9 6
Therefore, although chronic conditions may provide limited notice of an
employee's absence to employers, the Third Circuit includes those condi-
tions within FMLA coverage.
9 7
B. The Third Circuit's Advice to Employers
Throughout its decision, the Third Circuit noted several inadequacies
in the employer's administration of the employee's requested leave.9 8
First, the court found that the employer never certified the employee's
condition, in the form of second or third medical opinions. 99 Pursuant to
the FMLA, employers may clarify and authenticate the employee's request
by requiring the employee to undergo a physical examination by a health
care provider representing the employer. 100 Although Shadyside con-
terminated for taking FMLA-protected leave). The Third Circuit remanded the
case, instructing the district court to determine whether Victorelli's absence was
FMLA leave and whether her termination violated the FMLA. See id. at 190-91
(determining, however, that record indicates that "had it not been for her July 29
absence, Victorelli would not have been terminated" and inferring that if district
court determines that she suffered from serious health condition, Shadyside is lia-
ble under FMLA).
95. See id. at 190 ("The intent of the FMLA is not simply to protect those
whose condition causes continual incapacity. It is intended to protect those who
are occasionally incapacitated by an ongoing medical problem."). Victorelli's con-
dition was an example of one creating occasional incapacity, as her peptic ulcer
could flare up at any time, although it could generally be controlled by medica-
tion. See id. at 185 (describing Victorelli's condition).
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (3) (1993) (including chronic conditions in def-
inition of continuing treatment by health care provider); id. § 825.114(a) (2) (iii)
(C) (1998) (expanding definition of chronic serious health condition and stating
that this condition "[m]ay cause episodic rather than a continuing period of inca-
pacity"). Victorelli's condition, the court determined, exemplified episodic inca-
pacity, which may have been a result of her ongoing course of medication. See
Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 189 n.6 (describing how Victorelli's condition fit within final
regulations' definitions).
97. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 (describing plaintiff's condition as chronic).
98. See id. (reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment for Shadyside
and stating reasoning for decision). The Third Circuit qualified its decision, stat-
ing it did not mean that Victorelli satisfied the requirements of the FMLA. See id.
at 191 ("[W]e agree with the district court that Victorelli has not met her burden
of persuading us that she deserves to prevail as a matter of law.").
99. See id. at 188 (describing Shadyside's reliance on Victorelli's doctor's diag-
nosis that her condition was incurable).
100. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a) (1998) (presenting what employers may do if
they question adequacy of employee's medical certification). The regulations pro-
vide that if an employer has reason to doubt the validity of an employee's medical
certification, they may require second and even third opinions of the employee's
condition. See id. § 825.307 (a) (2) (allowing employers to obtain second and third
1998]
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tested Victorelli's condition, the hospital failed to verify her visits to the
doctor or the doctor's diagnosis of her condition, as is the employer's
right under the FMLA. 10 1 Second, the court also found that Victorelli's
supervisor took no steps to find out whether Victorelli actually suffered
from a peptic ulcer condition. 10 2 Third, Shadyside did not provide any
evidence or testimony challenging the medical adequacy of Victorelli's
claim. 103
The Third Circuit's suggestions and criticisms exemplify various ways
in which employers can regulate chronic serious health conditions.
10 4
Based upon its advice to Shadyside in Victorelli, the Third Circuit appears
to be warning employers to take every precaution available to them under
the FMLA to ensure that the employee requesting FMLA leave is actually
suffering from a serious health condition. These precautionary measures,
however, augment an employer's administrative duties when an employee
requests FMIA leave. Further, based on the FMLA's broad scope of appli-
cation, it is likely that courts may not dismiss employees' claims on sum-
mary judgment motions. 10 5 Therefore, if an employee is apparently
suffering from a minor condition, it is imperative for employers to review
and utilize the FMLA and its regulations to determine whether the condi-
tion may qualify for FMLA-protected leave. 10
6
opinions). The only drawback for employers is that the opinion is obtained at
their own expense. See id. (putting expense of additional medical opinions on
employers). Further, pending these opinions, the employee is "provisionally enti-
tled to the benefits of the [FMIA]." Id.
101. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 (describing what Shadyside failed to do in
evaluating Victorelli's condition).
102. See id. at 185 (stating that Victorelli's supervisor believed Victorelli was
sick when she reported that she could not come to work). The Third Circuit cited
a decision by the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
which found that Victorelli "had not participated in any willful misconduct relative
to her absences and had offered ample justification for her sick leave ...." Id. at
185 n.3. The Third Circuit did not, however, address whether Victorelli provided
Shadyside with adequate notice of her intention to take leave or whether notice
was even required under the FMLA's provisions. See id. at 185 (stating only that,
with one exception, Victorelli had provided Shadyside with doctor's excuse for her
illness, but not that she notified Shadyside prior to taking leave).
103. See id. at 188 (finding that, based on record that included no medical
evidence from Shadyside, reasonable jury could conclude that Victorelli suffered
from serious health condition).
104. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 540-42 (outlining ways in which
employers may challenge FMLA claims). Employers also need to be aware of their
duties under the FMLA, such as providing employees with notice of their FMLA
rights. See id. at 542 (discussing requirement that employers inform employees of
their FMLA rights "by publicly posting information concerning the act at the work-
site"). For a discussion of an employer's notice requirement under the FMLA, see
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 191 (reversing grant of summary judgment
against plaintiff, but noting that summary judgment in favor of plaintiff would also
be inappropriate).
106. See id. at 187 (reviewing FMLA and its provisions and stating that plain-
tiff's condition is not minor as matter of law).
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The FMLA's implementation in the workplace is extremely compli-
cated. 10 7 Although the regulations purport to assist employers and practi-
tioners in the FMLA's administration, they also provide a myriad of detail,
confusing and often frustrating employers. 10 Victorelli exemplifies how
the FMLA's expansive definitions and terminology may qualify a large
number of conditions for FMLA leave. 10 9 Furthermore, as the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis suggests, chronic serious health conditions create distinct
challenges to employers as they typically involve intermittent leave and
limited notice requirements. 110
Overall, the Third Circuit's careful analysis of Victorelli's potential
chronic health condition is an example of the close scrutiny applied by
courts struggling with FMLA claims."' Currently, employers are urging
Congress to revise the FMLA and, more specifically, to streamline the defi-
nition of serious health condition and ease the FMLA's application in the
workplace. 112 If the FMLA is not revised, however, employers should take
note of the Third Circuit's suggestions and approach potential FMLA
leave requests from a procedural rather than a substantive viewpoint-
107. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 540 (noting that there is no bright
line determination of when conditions will satisfy FMLA provisions and regula-
tions); Buchanan, supra note 5, at 12d (discussing frustrations experienced by em-
ployers attempting to administer FMLA and its cumbersome regulations and
provisions); see also Klein & Pappas, supra note 2, at 2 (analyzing family leave regu-
lations and expansive view taken by DOL in changing these regulations).
108. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing implementation of
final regulations and stating that "the regulations have become lengthier, more
complicated and, in many instances, more difficult to apply"); Wilson & Hoch,
supra note 41, at 535 (observing that definition of serious health condition in regu-
lations "encompasses a myriad of situations" and that each case warrants individual
review) (footnote omitted).
109. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 187 (discussing in detail lengthy definitions in
FMLA and stating that they are not to be interpreted narrowly).
110. See id. at 185 (describing limited notice Victorelli provided to employer
because of unexpected "flare-up" of her peptic ulcer condition); see also McClain v.
Southwest Steel Co., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 295, 297 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (describing
employee's absence because of reoccurring health condition).
111. See Wilson & Hoch, supra note 41, at 546 (discussing careful judicial re-
view of FMLA claims and fact that courts "have scrutinized FMLA claims closely to
ensure that the claim is one that, in fact, deserves protection of the statute"). For
this reason, one commentator suggested that defense counsel argue that not every
need for leave is protected by the FMLA, "no matter how sympathetically a court
might view it." Id.
112. See Family Leave, supra note 5, at DI (describing employers' urging to
revise FMLA and ease administrative problems). The Subcommittee on Employer-
Employee Relations plans to hear additional testimony on the FMLA and to look
more closely at the FMLA to address employer concerns. See id. (describing assur-
ances of Subcommittee Chairman Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich) and
Represenative Harris Fawell (R-Ill)). For a discussion of employers' reactions to
the FMLA and its provisions, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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employers should take advantage of the medical certification and notice
requirements.1 13
Employers who receive notification of an employee's leave for a per-
ceived minor ailment should take precautionary measures, review the cir-
cumstances and determine whether any employer obligations exist under
the FMLA.1 14 Thus, taking precautions early to administer and verify em-
ployee leave may preclude future claims of alleged FMLA violations
against employers. Utilizing the Third Circuit's guidance, employers
might ease the headaches created by attempting to administer the FMLA.
Debra E. Christenson
113. See Victorelli, 128 F.3d at 188 (advising employers by example of Shady-
side's failures); Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that because employer did not rebut plaintiffs claim through medical tes-
timony, "it remains for the trier-of-fact to decide if... [plaintiffs] multiple diagno-
ses taken together created a serious health condition").
114. See Price, 117 F.3d at 1025 (stating that it is important to consider
whether plaintiff satisfied requisite period of incapacity under FMLA and if her
treatment satisfied requirements of regulations). Further, employers should re-
quire medical certification in cases where they doubt FMLA coverage and require
that employees provide adequate notice in the applicable instances. See Buchanan,
supra note 5, at 12d (detailing potential complaints against employers and finding
that employers often fail to request medical certification in writing and fail to give
employees at least 15 days to obtain this certification).
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